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

RECRUITING

The Challenge of the All-volunteer Force

RECRUIT

By
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First, I will address the recruiting situation facing both the active and Reserve forces. Second, I will discuss recruiting resource needs starting with a general overview of the programming requests for additional Fiscal Year 1977 Resources. I will then describe the resources required to accomplish the FY 78 recruiting missions of the active and Reserve forces.

Active Forces Recruiting Situation

The challenge of meeting manpower requirements of the active forces on a voluntary basis has been successfully accomplished since termination of the draft. The active forces have managed to recruit on the average more than 400,000 non-prior service (NPS) personnel annually with recruit quality, measured in terms of high school completion and mental category, remaining at or above recruit quality levels experienced during the draft years.

Strength objectives were essentially met for FY 74 through FY 76. At the end of December 1976, there was less than 1 per cent difference between the active forces, actual and planned strengths, as shown in **Table 1.**

TING The Challenge of the All-volunteer Force

Current Service projections of future accession requirements indicate that the total number of non-prior service recruits needed will remain at about present levels, as shown in **Table 2.**

The four Services met their quantity recruiting objectives in FY 76. They recruited about the same number of non-prior service enlistees in the July to December 1976 period as they did in the comparable period a year earlier. However, per cent accomplishment of objective was less for all Services because the July to December 1976 objective was larger. Only the Air Force fully met its July to December 1976 objective. Because it opted to improve its quality mix at the expense of falling short both in strength and accessions, the Marine Corps was the only Service enlisting fewer recruits in July-December 1976 than in July-December 1975.

Table 1

Active Force Strengths

31 December 1976
(000s)

Service	Plan	Actual	% of Plan
Army	779	775	99.5
Navy	529	529	100.0
Marine Corps	190	189	99.0
Air Force	580	580	100.0
DoD Total	2,079	2,072	99.7

NOTE: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

Table 2

Active Force Accessions

(Non Prior Service Male and Female)
(000s)

Service	Actual		Plan		Projection
	FY 75	FY 76	FY 77	FY 78	FY 79-FY85
Army	184.6	180.2	181.1	175.7	177
Navy	101.1	93.5	102.8	90.1	94
Marine Corps	57.8	51.2	49.5	46.3	48
Air Force	75.5	72.9	77.0	82.0	82
DoD Total	419.0	397.8	410.4	394.1	401

DEFENSE NEWS BRIEFS

Defense to Acquire Petroleum for SPR

The Defense Department will acquire petroleum for this country's Strategic Petroleum Reserve under an agreement with the Federal Energy Administration (FEA). Defense, with technical assistance from FEA, will perform all phases of contract administration.

The Strategic Petroleum Reserve Program is intended to diminish U.S. vulnerability in the event of a severe interruption to its energy supply. It also is intended to provide limited protection against short-term economic consequences of interruptions in supplies of petroleum products.

★★★★

10th SOLID SHIELD Exercise Set for May

SOLID SHIELD 77, the 10th in a series of annual joint training exercises, will be conducted in the areas of Camp Lejeune, N.C., and Fort Stewart, Ga., during May by the U.S. Atlantic command.

This year's exercise will emphasize command and control of a unified environment. More than 40,000 Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and Coast Guard personnel are expected to participate, including about 3,000 Reservists and National Guardsmen.

The exercise scenario, simulating military action between two opposing forces, will include naval, air, and ground maneuvers, air control and defense exercises, and an evacuation of noncombatants by helicopter.

★★★★

Register Publishes CHAMPUS Regulation

A new Regulation governing all aspects of the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) was published in the Federal Register on April 4.

Most of the provisions of the regulation will go into effect on June 1, 1977.

An intensive effort is being made by the Department of Defense to acquaint CHAMPUS beneficiaries and sponsors with provisions of the new regulation. A future issue of **Commanders Digest** will be devoted to this subject.

★★★★

Navy Commissions Spruance Class Destroyer

The sixth ship in the Spruance class of multi-mission U.S. Navy destroyers, USS Arthur W. Radford (DD-968), was commissioned on April 16 at Pascagoula, Mississippi.

The ship, which can maintain speeds in excess of 30 knots, is primarily an anti-submarine weapon system, but will have other missions. It may be assigned to bombard shore positions, support amphibious assaults, escort military and merchant convoys, perform surveillance and tracking of hostile surface ships, establish blockades, and conduct search and rescue operations.

Its armament consists of two 5-inch/54 caliber guns, an anti-submarine rocket (ASROC) launching group, torpedo tubes, and anti-submarine helicopters. The ship is designed to allow for installation of updated weapons and electronic systems.

Table 3 compares non-prior service accession results for the two six-month periods.

In meeting the Services' replacement manpower requirements, the recruiting commands attempt to select those applicants who have the highest likelihood of completing their contracted term of service.

They accomplish this by screening applicants physically, morally, mentally, and educationally. Mental quality and educational attainment, as indicators of success, will be discussed here.

The Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) provides a measure of the applicant's general trainability and permits classification of the applicant into one of the five mental groups commonly used to categorize enlistment mental quality. It should be noted that the military Services do not enlist personnel in the well-below-average category—Mental Group V. The proportion of below-average (Mental Group IV) enlistees has been decreasing with the advent of the Volunteer Force, as shown in **Table 4.**

Although numerous efforts have been undertaken to develop psychological and sociological tests that would effectively measure applicants' potential for adapting to life in a military environment, the best single measure currently available is educational attainment as evidenced by possession of a high school diploma.

Male high school graduates increased both in numbers and as a proportion of new recruits in FY 76. The increase was primarily due to the Services' high production in the last half of calendar year (CY) 1975. Recruiting in CY 76 resulted in the first downturn in the number of male graduates recruited since the Volunteer Force came into effect in January 1973, as illustrated in **Table 5.**

Table 3

Non-Prior Service Enlisted Accessions—Men and Women

(000s)

Service	July-December 1976			July-December 1975		
	Objective	Actual	Per Cent	Objective	Actual	Per Cent
Army	95.5	90.0	94	89.8	88.9	99
Navy	55.6	53.7	97	51.5	51.2	99
Marine Corps	26.2	23.8	91	26.8	27.2	102
Air Force	37.7	38.0	101	37.6	38.0	101
DoD Total	215.1	205.5	96	205.7	205.4	99

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

Table 4

Mental Category IV Personnel

(Per cent of Total Non-Prior Service Accessions)[a]

	All Services	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
FY64	15	19	11	9	4
FY72	18	19	20[b]	22	9
FY75	6	10	5	3	<1
FY76	5	7	5	3	<1
Jul-Dec 1976	5	8	3	4	<1

[a] Includes inductees in FY 64 and FY 72.
[b] Regular NPS males (less Filipino) only.

Table 5

Male High School Graduates

(Number and Per Cent of New Male Accessions)

	CY73	CY74	CY75	CY76
Number in 000s	209	229	257	238
% of New Male Accessions	65	58	71	65

For each Service, the number of male and female high school graduates entering service during the July-December 1976 period was less than the number entering during the corresponding period a year ago. For all four Services, the decline totals about 11,000, or about five percentage points, in the proportion of high school graduates accessed—as shown in **Table 6.**

The Army experienced the largest decease. The Marine Corps recruited somewhat fewer high school graduates, but their July-December 1976 percentage was up because they limited the number of non-high school graduates—and thus their total accessions—during the 1976 period. Experience has shown that the Services tend to recruit a higher proportion of high school graduates during the July-December period than they recruit during January-June of the following calendar year. In FY 76, the Services recruited 273,000 male and female high school graduates, accounting for 69 per cent of total NPS accessions. If the typical pattern holds, as we believe it will, the 12-month period from July 1976 through June 1977 is likely to yield lower high school graduate accession content than was accomplished in the corresponding 12 months a year earlier.

A number of factors have contributed to the increased difficulty of attracting high quality enlistees. Since the fall of 1975, there has been a significant decline in the propensity to enlist in the military among young men as measured by our semi-annual attitude tracking survey. At the same time, improvements in the economy have increased civilian sector competition for employable young men. These factors have been compounded by the fact that the recruiting momentum established by the Services up through FY 75 was lost due to the severe reduction in resources imposed midway in FY 76. These 1976 resource reductions amounted to reductions below Service requests of about 38 per cent in advertising, and about 15 per cent for the overall recruiting program. These reductions took effect just as the recruiting market was beginning to tighten.

The future active force recruiting picture appears increasingly challenging. The declining youth population projected for the 1980s has focused attention on the question of the viability of the Volunteer Force during the next decade. The main questions appear to center on the Services' ability to recruit in the face of a declining youth population base and possible lower unemployment rates in the 1980s.

We know that the number of 18-year-old men in the United States will decline after 1980. By 1985, the number of 18-year-old males will have declined gradually by about one-third of a million, or 15 per cent less than in 1976. By 1992, the decline will have totalled more than one-half million, or 25 per cent.

Assuming the proportion of males finishing high school remains the same as in the recent past, more intense competition for graduates is likely. We are unsure of the quantitative effect of this competition on enlistment supply.

During the period 1976 to 1990, the labor force as a whole is expected to increase by about 20 per cent. More importantly, the 25-54 year-old group will increase by a very large 37 per cent. Unless civilian job opportunities for this older segment of the labor market increase at the same rate, it would appear that the inexperienced 18-year-old will find the competition from the older, more experienced workers more intense than it is today. Under this set of circumstances, the opportunities for training and gaining work experience offered by the military may be more attractive than they appear to today's 18-year-old, and our potential enlistment supply may be affected positively.

Unemployment certainly influences the Services' ability to compete for recruits. However, this

WHAT THEY ARE SAYING . . .

"I consider equitable arms control agreements to be a help—not a hindrance—in strategic nuclear planning. . . .Despite this conviction, I strongly favor continuation of a substantial diversified, modernized U.S. strategic nuclear force. I think that is what is required to maintain a stable balance of forces and an effective deterrent."

—HAROLD BROWN, *Secretary of Defense, in an address at the University of Rochester, April 13, 1977.*

Table 6

Non-Prior Service Enlisted Accession

(Male and Female High School Graduates)
(000s)

Service	July-December 1976		July-December 1975		FY76
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Per Cent
Army	50.1	56	57.8	65	59
Navy	40.0	75	41.0	80	76
Marine Corps	16.8	71	17.2	63	62
Air Force	33.1	87	34.7	91	89
DoD Total	140.0	68	150.8	73	69

NOTE: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

factor alone does not determine success or failure of our ability to man the force. In fact, the most recent survey available of new recruits showed that a large percentage (about 74 per cent) were either working or going to school prior to enlisting. That is, they were not unemployed.

Beyond improving accession input quality, all management options will continue to be evaluated to reduce accession requirements. Obviously, our attrition rates are a matter of serious concern, and our efforts to reduce them are continuing. We will continue our efforts to increase the enlistment supply base and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of our recruiting program. For example, we need to attract more males with one or more years of college to our enlisted ranks, and we may be able to relax physical standards for entry. We have been directed by the Secretary of Defense to conduct an assessment of the Volunteer Force. That assessment will involve intensive evaluation of those management options that may offer opportunity to reduce male non-prior service accession requirements. These include, for example, increased use of women, civilians and prior-service personnel.

Reserve Forces Recruiting Situation

Currently, the most serious challenge to the Volunteer Force concept is maintenance of Reserve component strength. The Reserves will require increased recruiting resources and improved recruiting management. **Table 7** gives Selected Reserve strengths and shortages for FY 76 and the transition quarter.

The combined Army National Guard and Army Reserve shortfall during the transition quarter was about 55,000 or approximately 76 per cent of the total Selected

"Our allies have made it clear that if standardization is really to work, it must not simply be everyone purchasing the U.S. systems. They want the U.S. to be open to purchasing their weapons. Our policy is consistent with the desires of our NATO allies. We will buy their weapons when they meet our needs, are cost effective, and will foster interoperability and standardization."

—JACQUES S. GANSLER, *Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Materiel Acquisition), before the Cape Canaveral Chapter of the National Contract Management Association, April 5, 1977, at Patrick AFB, Florida.*

"The CHAMPUS program is an absolutely splendid health benefit program. During the process of the development of the new regulations, we compared CHAMPUS benefits with the high option Federal employees program, with the best of the Blue Cross/Blue Shield program, and CHAMPUS stood above each one of them. So, I don't believe there's any place that you can find a health benefit program as good as the CHAMPUS program is."

—DR. ROBERT SMITH, *Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, in a Directions 77 interview for an Armed Forces Radio Television broadcast April 4, 1977.*

Table 7

Selected Reserve Strength[a]

(Average Strength in 000s)

	FY 1976			FY TQ		
	Congressional Action[b]	Actual	Short	Congressional Action[b]	Actual	Short
ARNG	400.0	380.4	19.6	400.0	363.8	36.2
USAR	219.0	213.5	5.5	212.4	193.3	19.1
USNR	102.0	98.3	3.7	102.0	97.0	5.0
USMCR	32.5	31.3	1.2	33.0	29.4	3.7
ANG	94.9	92.9	2.0	94.5	91.0	3.6
USAFR	51.8	49.8	2.0	53.6	48.5	5.1
DoD Total	900.1	866.2	33.9	895.6	823.0	72.6

[a] Numbers may not add due to rounding.
[b] As modified by the Appropriations Conference Committee.

Reserve shortfall of about 73,000. Strengths in these two components have been steadily declining during the last 18 months. This decline has been caused by the loss of draft motivated individuals who enlisted in the late 1960s and early 1970s. They have completed their six year military Service obligation and have elected not to reenlist. Further, the recruiting level of effort, to date, has not been able to attract enough people to replace these losses.

In addition to strength shortages, the Selected Reserve is also experiencing a decline in the quality of non-prior service male accessions as compared with the draft era when many men with some college training chose Reserve duty as an alternative to being drafted. The proportion of NPS accessions who possess above average mental ability has declined since FY 72 from about 51 per cent to about 24 per cent in FY 76. The high school graduate content of NPS male accessions has dropped from about 85 per cent in FY 72 to about 55 per cent in FY 76. In itself, this drop in NPS accession quality has not had a dramatic affect on Reserve force quality, since most Reserve accessions have been individuals with successful prior service in the active forces. For example, the high school graduate content of the Selected Reserve has been relatively stable. At the end of FY 75, it was about 87 per cent. It was about 85 per cent at the end of FY 76, and at the end of the first quarter of FY 77, it was 84 per cent.

However, as the proportion of NPS Selected Reserve accessions rises, the drop in NPS accession quality becomes more of a concern. The NPS share of accessions has risen from 20 per cent in FY 74 to 32 per cent in FY 75, and to 35 per cent in FY 76. The NPS proportion of the FY 77 and FY 78 accession requirements will be 37 per cent and 47 per cent respectively. The goal for a greater proportion of NPS enlistees will require increased emphasis on quality enlistments if the quality of the Selected Reserve is to be maintained.

Further, the Selected Reserve accession objectives (non-prior service and prior service) are estimated to be about 251,300 for FY 77 and about 250,300 for FY 78. The highest annual accession number for the Selected Reserve since termination of the draft has been only about 226,000 enlistments in FY 74. The peak in accession estimates is mainly attributable to the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard. These high accession needs and the required emphasis on better non-prior service accession quality demand an improved recruiting effort.

There are a number of differences between active force and Reserve recruiting which do not permit easy one-to-one transfers of expertise from the active to the Reserve problem area. The degree of Reserve and active market overlap is uncertain. Reserve recruiting and service is a local rather than a national process.

While our management experience for Selected Reserve recruiting is much less than for the active force, we recognize the problem; and we are requesting resources both to improve and intensify our Reserve recruiting capability and to improve the quality of Reserve unit training.

Recruiting Resources

With the recruiting situation as background, I will now turn to the issue of recruiting resource requirements. The following tables summarize the FY 77 and FY 78 enlisted recruiting resource programs of the Services. **Table 8** shows the Active Force display, and **Table 9** gives the Selected Reserve summary.

FY 77 Active Force Reprogramming.

The combined Service needs for enlisted active force recruiting resources in FY 77 are approximately $491 million. Of this, $42 million are additional resources needed to counter the increased recruiting difficulty.

The reprogramming needs involve additional requests as follows: Army—$24.2 million, Navy—$1.3 million, Marine Corps—$14.4 million, and Air Force—$2.1 million. **Table 10** displays the individual line items which constitute these totals.

These FY 77 active force reprogramming actions would represent an increase of $42 million, or 9.3 per cent from the currently approved level of $449.3 million. Viewed in terms of the FY 75 program, the total revised FY 77 program of $491.3 million represents an actual reduction in purchasing power of about 11 per cent. This reduction in real recruiting resources translates into a 7 per cent decline in real purchasing power per accession, as well. The recruiting challenge is made even more difficult when compared with FY 75, in that the G. I. Bill educational benefits package has been significantly downgraded, and the Army and the Marine Corps no longer have the two-year enlistment option available.

The added active force recruiting resources for FY 77 are needed to

Table 8

Active Force Enlisted Recruiting Resources[a]

($ Millions)

By Service	Total	Army	Navy[b]	Marine Corps[b]	Air Force	Multi-Service
FY 1978 Request	558.5	286.4	104.4	69.8	59.9	37.9[c]
FY 1977 Revised	491.3	236.8	99.2	66.3	53.0	35.9[c]
Reprogramming Included in FY 1977 Amounts[d]	(42.0)	(24.2)	(1.3)	(14.4)	(2.1)	—

By Application	Total	Enlistment Bonus	Military Pay[e]	Civilian Pay	Rcrtr Supt.[f]	Leased Space	Advertising[g]
FY 1978 Request	558.5	74.5	186.5	26.1	131.9	33.9	105.6
FY 1977 Revised	491.3	53.5	180.0	25.9	112.1	31.9	87.9
Reprogramming Included in FY 1977 Amounts[d]	(42.0)	(5.0)	(7.7)		(10.2)		(19.1)

[a] Totals exclude cost of entry processing through the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations ($62M in each year). Also excluded, $21.8M in FY 77 and $25.5M in FY 78 as follows: telecommunications and computer ($11.5M Army and $1.8M Air Force in FY 77—$11.5M Army, $2.2M Air Force in FY 78) recruiter aide pay ($4.1M Army, $.6M Navy, $2.4M Marine Corps and $.7M Air Force in FY 77—$7.6M Army, $.9M Navy, $1.7M Marine Corps and $1.1M Air Force in FY 78) and recruiter aide travel ($.6M Navy in each year).

[b] Excludes Reserve recruiting resources (Navy: $8.6M in FY 77 and $8.7M in FY 78, and Marine Corps: $1.8M in FY 77 and $1.8M in FY 78) which are included in the Active Force budgets.

[c] Includes leased space ($33.9M in FY 78, $31.9M in FY 77) and Joint Advertising and Market Research ($4.0M in both FY 78 and FY 77).

[d] Service requests for increased recruiters do not affect military personnel account totals. Approval of reprogramming will, however, increase military personnel cost of recruiting by $2.3M for Army; $1.3M for Navy; $3.4M for Marine Corps and $.7M for Air Force. Marine Corps temporary duty recruiters will involve support costs of $1.4M. These amounts are included in the $42.0 million shown above.

[e] Excludes pay for recruiter aides.

[f] Includes support costs for recruiter aides.

[g] FY 78 and FY 77 figures include $4.0M for Joint Advertising and Market Research.

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding.

Table 9

Selected Reserve Recruiting Resources[a]

($ in Millions)

By Component	Total	Army National Guard	U.S. Army Reserve	U.S. Navy[b] Reserve	U.S. Marine Corps Reserve	Air National Guard	U. S. Air Force Reserve
FY78 Request	125.8	43.4	57.5	8.7	3.6	6.6	6.0
FY77 Revised	99.7	33.4	41.3	8.6	3.5	6.5	6.4
Reprogramming Included in FY77 Amounts	(24.8)	(7.5)	(15.5)	—	—	(1.8)	—

* * *

By Application	Total	Military Pay	Civilian Pay	Recruiter Support	Advertising
FY78 Request	125.8	80.8	7.7	17.6	19.7
FY77 Revised	99.7	64.6	7.5	12.6	15.0
Reprogramming Included in FY77 Amounts	(24.8)	(24.8)	—		—

[a] Totals may not add due to rounding.
[b] USNR recruiting resources are included in the active force budget.
[c] USMCR recruiting resources are primarily included in the active force budget. Amounts shown include $1.8M in FY 77, and $1.8M in FY 78 that are in Marine Corps active force budget.

aid in enlisting quality recruits now while the market is still available, to deal with the tougher recruiting market, and to regain the lost recruiting momentum resulting from the FY 76 reductions.

FY 77 Reserve Forces Reprogramming.

The Army Reserve, Army National Guard and Air National Guard plan to improve their capability in FY 77 to attain Congressionally authorized average strength levels by increasing the size of their respective recruiting forces. These increases will be achieved through manpower reprogramming rather than through increasing strength levels, and will add an additional $24.8 million to Reserve and National Guard Recruiting resources as shown in **Table 11.**

These FY 77 Reserve component reprogramming actions are accounted for mainly by the Army Reserve components which are experiencing about three-fourths of the total Selected Reserve shortages.

The Army National Guard needs an additional $7.5 million or a 30 per cent increase over the currently approved level of recruiting resources of $25.9 million. The Army Reserve's additional $15.5 million represents an increase of 60 per cent over the FY 77 approved level of $25.8 million.

The $24.8 million in additional FY 77 Selected Reserve recruiting resources is needed if we are to effectively address the Selected Reserve manpower shortages.

FY 78 Active Force Request

Turning now to FY 78, the Services need $558.5 million to conduct their recruiting and advertising programs to enlist about 414,300 individuals (394,100 non-prior service and 20,200 prior service). This is an increase of about 24 per cent more than the funds provided in the FY 77 appropriation and about 13.7 per cent more than the revised FY 77 level. While we do expect a drop of about 5.8 per cent in accession requirements between FY 77 and FY 78, a number of factors account for the increased funding request.

Inflation accounts for about 43 per cent of the increase requested in FY 78 over the revised FY 77 level. All of the factors mentioned earlier as contributing to a more difficult market will remain in FY 78. In

addition, the Services want to increase accession quality. We strongly believe this investment now will permit the Services to increase the content of high school diploma graduates during FY 78 and will avoid a more expensive recruiting and training operation in the future.

While the dollar increases requested over the revised FY 77 level appear substantial at about $67 million, total DoD recruiting and advertising resources—when adjusted for inflation—provide less resources in total in FY 78 than the Services had available in FY 75. On a recruiting and advertising cost per accession basis for all four Services, there is a small real increase over FY 75 of only about 5 per cent. The Services are, in essence, attempting to restore the recruiting momentum established up through FY 75, the year that preceded the substantial FY 76 cuts which, combined with the more difficult recruiting market, have significantly affected their recruiting efforts.

Between FY 75 and FY 76, there have been shifts in the distribution of recruiting and advertising resources among the Services in accordance with the relative difficulty of achieving their accession requirements.

The Army and Marine Corps, which have the greatest difficulty in attracting new personnel, have a larger share of the total recruiting budget. The Army's request for FY 78 will provide it with about the same constant dollar level of resources that it had in FY 75. The Marine Corps' request provides it with an increase of about 20 per cent in constant dollar resources. The Navy request for FY 78 will provide it with about 23 per cent less real resources than it had available in FY 75. A similar calculation for the Air Force shows a 25 per cent decline in real resources.

In using recruiting resources, the Services have significantly reduced headquarters and field supervisory personnel and increased the numbers of production recruiters. In FY 75, the Services expended 8,019 man-years in support of 11,927 production recruiters. The FY 78 program provides only 6,221 support man-years for 12,198 production recruiters, which is 271 more than the Services had in the field in FY 75. Recruiter support costs have increased by about 20 per cent in real terms, reflecting the increase in production recruiters as it costs more to support production recruiters than field or headquarters staff personnel. While advertising appears to have increased significantly from the actual FY 75 program level of $89.1 million to the $105.6 million needed for FY 78, the increase is more than offset by inflation. The amount of advertising that the FY 78 program will purchase is actually about 3 per cent below the FY 75 program level when inflation is considered.

Table 10

FY77 Active Force Reprogramming Needs

($ in Millions)

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Total
Military Pay	$ 2.3	$1.3	$ 3.4	$ .7	$ 7.7
Recruiting Support	5.5	—	3.3	1.4	10.2
Advertising	11.4	—	7.7	—	19.1
Enlistment Bonus	5.0	—	—	—	5.0
Total	$24.2	$1.3	$14.4	$2.1	$42.0

Table 11

FY77 Reserve Component Reprogramming Request

($ in Millions)

	Army National Guard	U.S. Army Reserve	Air National Guard	Total
Military Pay	$7.5	$15.5	$1.8	$24.8

FY 78 Reserve Forces Request.

Leaving the active force and turning now to the resource requirements of the Selected Reserve in FY 78, it is clear that arresting the decline in Selected Reserve strengths is the most challenging task currently facing the All Volunteer Force. The immediate

effort involves not only improved recruiting but also improved training which should lead to improved retention.

For FY 78, we need $125.8 million for Selected Reserve recruiting and advertising programs designed to enlist about 250,300 individuals (118,300 non-prior service and 132,000 prior service). This represents about 68 per cent increase over the currently approved FY 77 level and about a 26 per cent increase over the revised FY 77 request.

Compared to FY 75, the FY 78 request involves an increase of about 69 per cent, in real terms, in Selected Reserve recruiting resources. It represents an increase, also considering inflation, of about 48 per cent on a cost per accession basis between FY 75 and FY 78. The increase is indicative of the need for more intensive Reserve recruiting. Planned FY 78 Selected Reserve recruiting costs per accession are on the average only about 37 per cent of those for the active force.

In addition to the increases in recruiting resources, the Army is improving its Reserve recruiting management. Assignment of full-time Reserve recruiting personnel to assist units will not only increase the overall level of recruiting efforts, but will also permit Reserve commanders to increase their concentration on their primary mission—training Reserve personnel in the performance of their mission. This should impact positively on recruiting and retention.

The resources needed in FY 77 and FY 78 represent a major effort to reverse the downward trend in Reserve force manning and building to the desired levels. As our experience with intensified Reserve recruiting grows, we will be better able to determine if, and in what mix, additional resources may be necessary to achieve Reserve recruiting and retention objectives. Incentives, such as educational assistance and enlistment/reenlistment bonuses, may be important for successful Reserve force manning. However, we cannot at this time measure the need or forecast the effectiveness of such incentives. In the near future we expect to have, through the results of on-going studies, a better understanding of the application of incentives to Reserve recruiting and retention. We will most likely recommend further action to improve Reserve strengths as we learn from our studies and evaluate the results of the resources provided in FY 77 and FY 78.

The decline in Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) strength concerns us and is being extensively evaluated. The implementation of the All-Volunteer Force resulted in the active force receiving top recruiting priority, the Selected Reserve, second priority, and manning the IRR was not considered to be a recruiting task. We are now reviewing a number of alternatives to improve the IRR posture. Direct recruiting is one possible alternative.

Summary

The active forces are maintaining their strengths, but indications are that maintenance of necessary quality among enlistees will depend on the Services' ability to regain the recruiting momentum that had been achieved up through FY 75. This can only be accomplished through effective management and application of adequate recruiting resources. The program, we believe, is a balanced program of recruiting effort that will yield the necessary quality accessions now, before the declines in the market take effect. This should avoid even higher resource costs later and give other management actions a better chance of success in adapting to the market declines of the 1980s.

The Selected Reserve program should provide the opportunity to improve Reserve strength and to understand better the extent to which an intensive and well managed recruiting program will solve Guard and Reserve manning problems. As we improve our understanding of the potential effectiveness of additional Reserve Component incentives, it is likely that we will seek Congressional support for specific initiatives.



COVER: Taking the oath to become a member of the U.S. Navy.

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SPECIAL REPORT

The Case For Recruiting ADVERTISING

INTRODUCTION: Recruiting advertising is perhaps the most often challenged and least understood function involved in the personnel procurement process. Advertising in any arena is often suspect and sometimes maligned—principally because it is so difficult to demonstrate its impact.

Nonetheless, given the importance of advertising to the recruiting process, every reasonable effort must be made to support it.

Manifestly, the recruiting advertising function has played a key role in sustaining the volunteer force.

BACKGROUND: During the years preceding the all-volunteer force era, the draft served as a mechanism for powerfully and pervasively focusing the attention of young people and their parents of the possibility of military service. When draft calls ended in late 1972, the military services—including the Reserve components—had to seek alternative means of attracting the attention of prospective enlistees.

Mass media advertising was one of the most promising of such alternatives and the Services rapidly moved to allocate resources to support an effective program of providing information and stimulating interest in enlistment by this means.

A basic assumption which underlies the military recruiting program is that the long term future of the Volunteer Force depends in large measure on the ability of the Services to provide information which enables the enlistment prospect to make a sound and informed choice regarding military services. Advertising can significantly improve our ability to provide such information.

SCOPE: As a matter of national policy, the Services seek to draw their volunteers from all regions of the country and from all ethnic and socio-economic groups. Each year more than 500,000 young men and women are selected from an enlistment pool of about 10 million 17-21 year olds who are estimated to be qualified for active and Reserve component military service. To successfully attain recruiting goals the Services must create a favorable recruiting environment with regard to attitudes toward military service, attract and hold the attention of a significant proportion of the enlistment market, and elicit direct expressions of interest from a vast number of young people who will enter the screening process which hopefully leads to an enlistment decision.

THE COMMUNICATION PROCESS: The military Services have long been aware that the most effective and persuasive means of conveying information about enlistment opportunities is face-to-face communication between prospect and recruiter. However, given the relatively small number of recruiters and the very large number of prospective enlistees, a really effective communication effort without heavy reliance on the mass media becomes a physical and economic impossibility.

Because the decision to enlist in a military service for several years is such an important one, it was obvious that recruiting advertising could not be the prime factor in the communication of enlistment information. This is the role of the recruiter who can respond

The photo at right depicts the type of national advertising used for recruiting.

credibly to a broad range of prospect inquiries and aid the prospect in the enlistment decision. Therefore, the role of recruiting advertising was determined to be recruiter support aimed at creating a general awareness of military service opportunities, affecting general attitudes toward enlistment and providing prospect leads to recruiters.

MANAGEMENT: As the Services implemented necessary large scale advertising programs, close attention was given to the management of the considerable fiscal resources involved. Each Service established an advertising directorate comprised of carefully selected military and civilian personnel. A principal task of each advertising directorate was to manage and monitor the performance of the contract advertising agencies which were selected to create advertising and purchase media time and space.

To minimize duplicative effort and eliminate counter-productive competition, the Services formed a coordinating committee, the Joint Advertising Directors of Recruiting (JADOR). JADOR has proved an effective forum for formulating advertising management decisions on issues with joint service implications. Through this mechanism, joint Service discounts have been negotiated, media weight standards set, and a broad range of Service advertising guidelines established. The efficiency of the JADOR operation served as the impetus for the formation of the Joint Educational Liaison Directors of Recruiting (JELDOR) and the Joint Market Analysis Research Committee (JMARC) which coordinate the Services' interface with the education community and market research efforts respectively.

All three of these joint Service entities work closely with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affair). The overriding objective of these management efforts is to assure that the recruiting effort is given the best possible advertising support and that the total DoD advertising effort is cost effective.

THE MEDIA: To accomplish the task of effectively providing information to prospects and those who advise or influence them, the Services have employed a wide variety of communications media.

Media mixes have included magazines, newspapers, billboards, and direct mail. More recently, the Services received approval to purchase airtime in both radio and television and are integrating these media into their overall plans. Further, the Services and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) are testing the effectiveness of joint service advertising—that is, advertising which centers on the concept of military service in general.

EVALUATION: Gauging the effect of advertising is a difficult and inexact science. There is no methodology which can provide rockhard data on what part of the enlistment decision process can be attributed to a given advertisement—especially when such an important decision as military enlistment is involved.

Notwithstanding the difficulty of quantification, the Services have exerted sustained and concentrated efforts to answer the question "What do we get for our advertising dollar?"

Uncle Sam needs me."
Since 1636... the most important part-time job in America.
national guard
The Guard belongs.
BY THE TIME YOU GET YOUR FEET WET OUTSIDE, YOU COULD MAKE ANOTHER RATING INSIDE
GOOD
NAVY

They have relied principally on the measurement of direct responses (coupons, cards, toll-free telephone calls, etc) and survey research which yields data on awareness of and attitudes toward military service. In addition, some experimental advertising research has been completed and more extensive field experiments are being developed.

RESULTS: There is substantial evidence that recruiting advertising has provided extremely effective support to recruiters. Nearly all enlistees say they have seen or heard military service advertising and more than half of all enlistees report that the advertising had a strong influence on their enlistment decisions.

In addition, the Services report that during fiscal year 1977 they expect that well over a million prospect leads generated by advertising will be provided to recruiters.

In controlled experimentation with paid radio advertising, all four military Services showed improved performance on one or more effectiveness measures in markets where radio advertising was used. The radio advertising caused increases in prospect inquiries, recruiting office traffic and enlistments.

Military recruitment advertising also has contributed to recruit quality levels by relieving recruiters from the time consuming process of prospect canvassing and allowing them to do a better job of screening and processing prospective enlistees.

THE FUTURE: The task of communicating relevant information about military service opportunities to prospective enlistees and their parents involves coping with a dynamic market. Each year many young people enter—and leave—the prospect pool and each year the enlistment offerings of the Services change as incentives and options are added, altered, or dropped. This requires that the military Services continue effective, well-managed recruiting advertising programs to communicate information to prospective enlistees.

Given projections for a more difficult recruiting environment in the years to come, it appears certain that recruiting advertising will continue to play a crucial communications role in the interest of meeting the Nation's military manpower requirements. It is of critical importance that adequate resources are made available for the key recruiter support function of advertising if we are to continue to have a well-balanced and successful recruiting effort in support of the volunteer force.

—Vice Admiral John G. Finneran
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Military Personnel Policy)

WHO'S NEWS IN DEFENSE

New Preparedness Chief

Bardyl R. Tirana has been appointed to direct the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, effective April 13.

Tirana, 39, has been a practicing attorney since his graduation from Columbia Law School in 1962. He also holds a degree from Princeton University. His legal experience includes service with the Department of Justice and private practice with two Washington, D.C. law firms.

Perry Is New DDR&E



Dr. William James Perry took the oath of office on April 11, 1977, as Director of Defense Research and Engineering.

The Vandergrift, Pa., native is a graduate of Stanford University and received his PhD degree in Mathematics from Penn State University.

Dr. Perry has served on scientific advisory committees for the Department of Defense and the National Security Council.

Retirements

Lt. Gen. Harold G. Moore, Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, to be retired in grade.

Gen. Louis T. Seith, USAF, Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters (SHAPE), to be retired in grade effective Aug. 1, 1977.

Mann Sworn In

Dr. David E. Mann was sworn in as Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development on April 14.

A native of New York City, Dr. Mann is a graduate of the City University of New York and the University of Chicago, where he received a PhD degree in Chemistry.

Prior to his appointment, Dr. Mann had been special assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations for Navy Advanced Systems Projects. His government career also includes service with the National Bureau of Standards and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

Takes Oath

David E. McGiffert has taken the oath of office as Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs).

Gerald P. Dinneen has been sworn in as Assistant Secretary of Defense (Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence), ASD (C^3).

John C. Stetson took the oath of office as Secretary of the Air Force on April 6, 1977.

Russell Murray II, previously at the Center for Naval Analyses, became the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Planning, Analysis and Evaluation) on April 28, 1977.

Deanne C. Siemer, Harvard Law School, was sworn in as Department of Defense General Counsel on April 28, 1977.

Appointments

Gen. (Ret.) Andrew J. Goodpaster has been named as the 51st Superintendent of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He will return to active duty in June in the grade of lieutenant general. General Goodpaster last served as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe from July 1969 to December 1974.

Assignments

Gen. Richard H. Ellis, has been selected to replace **Gen. Russell E. Dougherty** as Commander, Strategic Air Command and Director, Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff. General Dougherty will be retired Aug. 1, 1977.

Gen. William J. Evans, will replace General Ellis as Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe and Commander, Allied Air Forces, Central Europe.

Lt. Gen. Lew Allen, Jr., is slated to replace General Evans as Commander, Air Force Systems Command. He also has been nominated for promotion to general.

Maj Gen Abbott C. Greenleaf, has been named Deputy Chief of Staff/Programs and Resources, Headquarters, USAF, and nominated for promotion to lieutenant general. Formerly, he served as the Director of Programs, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff/Programs & Resources, Headquarters, USAF.

Maj. Gen. John Q. Henion, has been named Commanding General, IX Corps/U.S. Army, Japan, and nominated for promotion to lieutenant general. He was serving as Chief of Staff, US Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia.

Lt. Gen. Kenneth L. Tallman, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Hq. USAF, will succeed General Allen as Superintendent of the Air Force Academy.

Lt. Gen. James A. Hill, has been reassigned from Deputy Chief of Staff, Programs and Resources, HQ. USAF, to Comander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF).

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